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[Crlm. No. 5423. In Bank. Aug. 14, 1953.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ARTHUR CISTO CARNINE,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide - Evidence. - Evidence that defendant entered a
clothing store, struck proprietor on head causing him to fall
to floor, dragged him to a washroom toward rear of building,
took money from his wallet, packed a suitcase with clothing
from store, left store in victim's car, and that two days later
victim's body was discovered in washroom with a leather thong
tied around his neck and several small puncture wounds in
upper part of his body, death having been caused by shock
and hemorrhage, is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the homicide in perpetration of robbery or
burglary and that he is therefore guilty of first degree murder.
(Pen. Code, § 189.)
[2] ld.-Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-A killing
is not first degree murder in perpetration of robbery, notwith-

(2] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 17.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(5); [2] Homicide,
§15(6); [3J Homicide, §27C; [4] Criminnl Law, §1311; [5] Criminal Law, § 733; [6J Homicide, § 270; [7J Homicide, §l4li [8]
Homicide, § l~
.
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standing killer takes money from victim's wallet after striking
the fatnl blows, if thought of tnking money occnrs to him only
after the attack has terminated.
[8] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.Error in failing to instruct jury in homicide ease that the
killing was not in perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate
robbery if defendant had not formed intent to rob victim until
after fatal blows were struck and he left victim's body lying
on floor of a washroom is not curad by general instructions
with reference to what constitutes first degree murder and
robbery "'here these instructions do not set forth defendant's
only available defense, aside from insanity, which is embodied
in refused instruction.
[4] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-Supreme
Court on appeal cannot weigh the evidence to determi~e
whether defendant's testimony was true or false.
[5] Id.-Instructions-Applicability to i·heories.-It is duty of
court to instruct on every theory of case finding support in
the evidence.
[6a,6b] Homicide-Appea.l-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-Error in failing to instruct jury in homicide case
that the killing was not in perpetration of or an attempt to
perpetrate robbery if defendant had not formed intent to rob
victim until after fatal blows were struck constitutes a miscarriage of justice within meaning of Const., art. VI, § 4¥l,
and a conviction of first degree murdel will be reversed, where
evidence is not inconsistent with defendant's testimony that
his attack on deceased was result of a sudden quarrel and that
taking of propel'ty was an afterthought, where defendant made
no appreciable effort to conceal his crime, which had few, if
any, of the indicia of careful planning, where instructions on
second degree murder carefully pointed out that murder could
not be of second degree if it was committed in perpetration
of a robbery or burglary, and where Supreme Court cannot
say that a different verdict would have been improbable had
requested instruction been given.
[7] Id.-Burden..of Proof .-Burden of proof is' on prosecution in
a homicide case to prove defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not incumbent on defendant to convince jury that his versioD of what occurred is
true.
[8] Id.-Evidenee.-Defendant in a homicide case is entitled to be
found guilty of no more than murder of second degree if his
testimony, viewed in light of other evidence, is sumcientto
create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of first degree murder.
Q
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APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239
(b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma
County. Donald Geary, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty reversed.
Paul Golis and Maurice Fredericks, under appointment by
the Supreme Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, Joseph Maddux, District Attorney
(Sonoma), and William G. Luckhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing
the death penalty following defendant's conviction of mst
degree murder.
The following facts are undisput.ed: On September 9, 1952,
defendant came to Santa Rosa from his mother's and stepfather's home a short distance out of town. He arrived before
noon and spent most of the afternoon in the Lido Bar drinking
beer and talking to the bartender and other patrons. About
5 p.m. he left the bar and went to Mr. Rosenbaum's near-by
clothing store. He observed a salesman with a sample case
talking to Mr. Rosenbaum and did not enter. He walked
round the block, returned to the Lido Bar, and about 15
minutes later returned to Mr. Rosenbaum's store. Mr. Rosenbaum was then alone, reading a newspaper. Defendant entered
the store, and after conversing with Mr. Rosenbaum, struck
him twice on the side of the face and head. Mr. Rosenbaum
fell to the floor, and defendant dragged him into a washroom
toward the rear of the building. Defendant took money from
his wallet, packed a suitcase with clothing from the store, and
took it with him when he left the scene in Mr. Rosenbaum's
car. He waited on one or two customers before he left the
premises. Two days later Mr. Rosenbaum's body was discovered in the washroom. There was a leather thong tied
around his neck and several small puncture wounds in the
upper part of his body. Death was caused by shock and hemorrhage owing to laceration of the face and scalp and congestion and edema of the lungs owing to strangulation. After
leaving the store, defendant drove to his parents' home and
then to a ranch where he had been employed. Later he returned to Santa Rosa, where he left Mr. Rosenbaum's car.
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On the evening of the 11th, the same day Mr. Rosenbaum's
body was found, he took a bus to San Francisco where' he was
apprehended.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity. He testified that he went to the store to buy work
clothes. Mr. RO'fmbaum was a friend of his and had lent him
$25, which defendant had not repaid. . After he had bought
the clothes he had an argument with Mr. Rosenbaum about
the loan. He struck Mr. Rosenbaum twice but did not intend
to kill him. He did not remember dragging him into the washroom or tying the thong round his neck or stabbing him. It
was not until after he had left Mr. Rosenbaum in the washroom and had started to leave the store that he decided to
return and take the money, clothing, and the car.
Although there is no dispute that defendant had been drinking before he attacked Mr. Rosenbaum, witnesses who saw
him both shortly before and after the crime testified that he
was not intoxicated. He remembered and described. most of
the events that occurred at the time. In a <:tatement made to
the district attorney and the police the day a fter his arrest,
he said that he had bought the work clothe~ from Mr. Rosenbaum earlier in the day and not at the tlJllL of the attack.
In that statement he made no reference to t Quarrel about a
loan.
On the trial of the issue of not guilty by reason of insanity,
four psychiatrists testified, one for the prosecution and three
who had been appointed by the court. They wert' ,tIl of the
opinion that defendant was legally sane at the th.e of the
commission of the crime. Testifying in his own behalf, defendant described some of his background and PI1:st experiences. He stated that he knew it was wrong to kill except
when in military service or in self-defense. None af the psychiatrists were....of the opinion that allythiJlg in defendant's
testimony indicated legal insanity. No witness h:stified that
defendant was legally insane.
[lJ The foregoing evidence is sufficient to <:lpport a finding that defendant committed the homicide i'l the perpetration of robbery or burglary, that lIe was : '. ~any sane at
the time of the crime, and that he is t.heref"re guilty of murder of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.) l>efendant contends, howeYer, that the trial court com:nitted prejudicial
error by refusing to instruct the jury I)U his theory of the
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case. He offered the following instruction, which the trial
court refused to give on the ground that it was not the law.
.. If you find that Defendant ARTIlUR CARNINE had not
formed an intention to rob !sroil Rosenbaum until after he
struck Isroil Rosenbaum, dragged his body into the washroom,
and left his body lying on the floor of the washroom;. then
you ne instructed that !sroil Rosenbaum \vas not killed by
ARTHUR CARNINE in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate, the crime of robbery."
[2] According to defendant's testimony he never intpnded
to killllfr. Rosenbaum and did not decide to take the property
until after the attack had terminated. As stated in PeopZe
v. Kerr, 37 Ca1.2d 11, 13-14 [229 P.2d 777], where the same
defense was ad,·anced in a similar factual situation, "It is
true that if defendant's thoughts followed the course described
by him the killing would not be first degree murder in the
perpetration of robbery. [Citations.] 71 Accordingly, the
instruction should have been given.
[8] It can not reasonably be contended that the error was
cured by the following general instructions with respect to
murder that were given by the court.
"Murder which is committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate the crime of robbery, is declared by law to be
murder of the first degree, and if you should find, beyond a
reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that the defendant,
Arthur C.Carnine,killed Isroil Rosenbaum in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery, as those
terms are defined herein, you will have no choice but to designate the offense as murder in the first degree.
"Murder which is committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate the crime of burglary, is declared by law to be
murder of the first degree, and if you should find, beyond
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that the defendant, Arthur C. Carnine, killed !sroil Rosenbaum in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the crime of burglary, as
those terms are defined herein, you will have no choice but
to designate the offense as murder in the first degree.
"Robbery is defined by Sectioll 211 of the Penal Code as
follows: 'Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property
in the possession of another, from his person. or immediate
presence, and against his will, accomplisbed by means of force
or fear.'
l'In so far as this case is concerned, the crime of burglary
is defined by section 459 of the Penal Code as follows: 'Every
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person who enters any . , , store . , . or other building with
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony, is guilty
of burglary.'
"The word 'perpetration' as used in these instructions, is
defined as the doing or performance or commission of an act
consciously or with a guilty intent, to commit the offense or
offenses charged as a wicked deed.
"If you find that the defendant Arthur Carnine had not
formed an intention to burglarize !sroil R{)senbaum's store
until after he struck lsroil Rosenbaum, dragged his body into
the washroom and left his body lying on the floor of the washroom-if he did such acts, then you are instructed that !sroil
Rosenbaum was not killed by Arthur Carnine in the perpetration of, or an attempt to perpetrate, the crime of burglary."
There is nothing in the foregoing instructions that sets forth
defendant's defense to the charge of murder committed in
the perpetration of robbery. It is not improbable that the
jury concluded that a lethal assault followed by a stealing
of the victim's property constituted murder in the perpetration of a robbery even though the intent to steal was not conceived until the assault had terminated. The instructions
not only left the door open to such a conclusion, but by specifically pointing out that in the case of murder committed in
the perpetration of burglary the criminal intent must have
been formed before defendant entered the store, they suggested that the time at which defendant formed the intent
to steal the property was irrelevant in the case of murder
committed in the perpetration of robbery.
Since defendant admitted that he had attacked 11r. Rosenbaum and thereafter had stolen his property, his only available defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of murder
of the first degree was that set forth in the refused instruction. Although the jury was not required to accept defendant's testimony that he never intended to kill Mr. Rosenbaum
and that he did not decide to steal his property until after
the assault was completed (People v. Kerr, supra, 37 Ca1.2d
11, 14), he was entitled to have them properly instructed
on the defense raised thereby, (People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d
768, 772-774 [228 P.2d 281], and cases cited.)
[4] This court cannot weigh the evidence to determine
whether defendant's testimony was true or false. That question was for the jury. Under the instructions given it is impossible to conclude from the verdict that the jury disbelieved him and accordingly found against his only available
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defense. [5J As stated in Daniels v. City & County of San
Francisco, 40 CaI.2d 614, 623 [255 P.2d 785J, "It is the
duty of the court to instruct on every theory of the case
finding support in the evidence. [Citations. J The ordinary
rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the evidence on one of several issues upholds [citationsJ has no
application here where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not
even presented to the jury as an issue affecting their right
of recovery. [Citations.]"
[6aJ Even if we were at liberty to weigh the evidence to
determine what credence the jury might have given defend·
ant's testimony had its relevance been pointed out to them,
we could not say that the evidence preponderated against the
-::ruth of his version of his mental processes. Defendant is
21 years of age. His formal education ended with the
sixth grade, although he had some further education during the period of approximately two years he spent in the
army after enlisting at the age of 16. After leaving the army
he wandered about the country working for brief periods at
various jobs. Several months before the crime he came to
Santa Rosa to live with his mother and stepfather. He soon
left Santa Rosa, however, and did not return until shortly
before the crime. The day before the crime he secured em·
ployment as a milker at a ranch. The following morning he
borrowed $10 from his stepfather to buy work clothes and
walked into town. He visited various bars and poolhalls
looking for friends and bought a half pint of whiskey and
drank it. About 2 :30 in the afternoon he went to the Lido
Bar where he stayed until he left to go to Mr. Rosenbaum's
store. While at the bar he drank from four to eight beers
and one whiskey. He testified that Mr. R{)senbaum was a
friend of his and that the reason he did not enter the store
when he first went there was that he saw that Mr. Rosenbaum
was busy and he did not wish to disturb him. He returned to
the Lido Bar, had another beer, and then returned to Mr.
Rosenbaum's store. After he had attacked Mr. Rosenbaum
and left him lying in the washroom he waited on two customers. He made no effort to hurry them out of the store,
but urged one of them to buy something else after he was
unable to find what the customer originally wanted. In addi.
tion to the money he found in Mr. Rosenbaum's wallet, he
took a suitcase and a box or boxes packed with clothing of
assorted sizes. He then took Mr. Rosenbaum's car and drove
to the ranch where he was employeg.. Qn the way he ~ove
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into a ditch and got other employees of the ranch to pull the
car out. He unloaded the clothing and later drove back to
town where he left the car. Later in the evening he took a
taxi to various bars and then back to the ranch. During the
evening he drank so much that the foreman was unable to
awaken him for the morning milking, and he was fired. Later
in the day he borrowed five dollars from his stepfather and
went to the Russian river with his cousin where they canoed
and drank whiskey. The following evening he decided to
leave town and took a bus to San Francisco. He took some
of the clothing he had stolen with him and left the rest at
his mother's and stepfather's cabin. The testimony of various
witnesses suggests that defendant had a rather easygoing,
happy-go-lucky disposition. He owned a gun, but he did not
use it in the commission of the crime.
The foregoing evidence is not inconsistent with defendant's
testimony that his attack on Mr. Rosenbaum was the result of
a sudden quarrel and that the taking of the property was an
afterthought. It is inconsistent with the theory of a planned
robbery or burglary. Defendant did not enter a store where
he was unknown or where he could expect to :find any large
amount of money. He made no appreciable effort to conceal
his crime. Not only did he expose himself to witnesses at the
scene, but he drove his victim's car to the ranch where he
worked and enlisted the aid of people who knew him to pull
the car out of the ditch. Had he killed Mr. Rosenbaum to
prevent his identification as a robber it is unlikely that
immediately thereafter he would 'leave a trail so easily followed. The evidence presents a picture of a crime committed
by a person whose behavior was generally erratic and who at
the time was at least partially under the influence of alcohol.
The crime pad few, if any, of the indicia of careful planning.
Under these circumstances it was a close question whether
defendant first decided to rob Mr. Rosenbaum and then killed
him in the perpetration of that robbery- 01' first attacked him
without premeditation and only thereafter decided to steal
his property.
It can not be inferred from the fact that the jury brought
in a verdict of murder of the first rather than of the second
degree that it decided this question against defendant. The
instructions on second degree murder carefully pointed out
that murder could not be of the second degree if it was committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary. Thus
these instructions referred the jury to those defining murder
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committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary, and
as pointed out above, none of the latter instructions explained
to the jury defendant's only defense to the charge of murder
committed in the perpetration of a robbery.
[7] In determining whether the error was prejudicial,
it bears emphasis that the burden was on the prosecution toprove defendant guilty of murder of the first degree beyond
a reasonable doubt. It was not incumbent upon defendant to
convince the jury that his version of what occurred was true.
[8] He was entitled to be found guilty of no more than
murder of the second degree if his testimony viewed in the
light of the other evidence was sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt of murder of the first degree. [6b] Under these circumstances we cannot say that a different verdict
would have been improbable had the requested instruction
been given. Accordingly, the error constituted a miscarriage
of justice within the meaning of article VI, section 4% of the
Constitution. (People v. Newson, 37 Ca1.2d 34, 45 [230 P.2d
618]; People v. Hamilton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
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